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Abstract This paper empirically examines whether GMO policies are “trade
related” for countries in Latin America (LA). First, we use the Balassa index to as-
sess the “revealed comparative advantage” of LA countries. We find that LA coun-
tries have a revealed comparative advantage in GMO industries relative to the
world, and that intra-regional trade in these industries is modest relative to external
trade. Second, we estimate the Gravity model to examine the effects of importers’
GMO policies on Argentina and Brazil’s bilateral exports of soybeans and maize.
We find that strong GMO policies in importers have a negative effect on
Argentina’s bilateral exports of soybeans (an industry and country with historically
high GMO content). Further, we find that past GMO policies are a strong deter-
minant of Argentina’s future bilateral exports, and that the negative trade effects of
strong GMO policies are increasing over time. In contrast, we find a weaker rela-
tionship between the GMO policies of importers and Brazil’s bilateral exports (con-
sistent with Brazil’s more recent increases in GMO content). These findings for
Argentina and Brazil provide a benchmark for other developing countries that are
looking for guidance on servicing trading partners with diverse GMO policies.
Key words: Empirical studies of trade, trade policy, Latin America, genet-
ically modified organisms.
JEL codes: F13; F14, Q17.
This paper examines policies and trade related to goods with a high content
of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). We focus on Latin America (and
Argentina and Brazil in particular), and on their trade in soybeans and maize
(the industries with the largest shares of GMO content globally). We refer to
these industries as “GMO-intensive” or “GMO industries” for brevity. Our
broad goal is to explore the extent to which GMO policies are “trade-related.”
VC The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Agricultural and Applied
Economics Association. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail:
journals.permissions@oup.com
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The motivation for this research is as follows. The history of global GMO
adoption dates back to 1995, when the first GMO crops were commercial-
ized in the United States. The development of these crops stemmed largely
from private-sector innovation and was directed primarily toward crops in-
tended for monoculture cultivation in technologically-developed settings.
Argentina, with a highly developed agricultural sector and climate and soil
conditions resembling those of the United States, was an early adopter,
legalizing GMO crop cultivation in 1996. Due to extensive smuggling of
seeds out of Argentina through Paraguay to Brazil and Uruguay,
Argentina’s neighbors soon found themselves with illicit GMO sectors of
their own (Gaisford and Kerr, 2004). Indeed, GMO maize, soybeans, cotton,
and canola thrived on the pampas of Paraguay and Uruguay and through-
out southern Brazil, obliging Mercosur governments to legalize GMO crops
and codify their regulation (Silva Gilli, 2010).
From these beginnings, Latin America (LA) as a region, and Mercosur
countries in particular, have distinguished themselves globally by their
rapid adoption of GMO technologies.1 Eleven LA countries have legalized
GMO crops as of 2013, representing half of all developing world adopters.2
Indeed, 40% (or 71.2 million hectares) of global GMO crop hectares were
located in LA as of 2013, and rates of expansion show no signs of slowing
(see James 2013).
Nevertheless, policy makers charged with managing this transition find
themselves confronted with several challenges. First, many LA agricultural
producers have a history of exporting to either the United States or the
European Union (EU). However, the EU’s resistance to GMOs and strict
tracking and labeling requirements means that countries choosing to adopt
GMOs may jeopardize export markets for their products. Thus, trade rela-
tionships provide a context for adoption and regulation decisions. Second,
countries face the technical challenges of maintaining their own national
regulations as well as complying with international standards such as those
established in the Codex Alimentarius (Joint FAO/WHO Codex
Alimentarius Commission, 1992) (which defines international standards to
protect consumer health and promote fair trade practices) and the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological
Diversity, 2005) (which includes procedures for trans-boundary movements
of living modified organisms). That is, countries need to develop their insti-
tutional infrastructure for managing national and international regulations
relevant to GMO technologies.
In short, the countries of LA, and Mercosur in particular, are at the fore-
front of the developing world in grappling with the trade-related aspects of
GMO policies. In this way, LA’s experience provides a baseline for other de-
veloping countries contemplating how to manage the trade and policy chal-
lenges of this evolving technology area.
The body of economics literature on GMOs is modest but growing. The
existing scholarly research falls into four overlapping categories covering
production, consumption, international trade, and policy.3 The body of
1Mercosur is a customs union consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela.
2Latin American countries that have legalized GM crops include Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
3Production studies tend to focus on the implications of GMO adoption for the welfare of producers (e.g.,
farmers). Farm-level effects of GMO adoption include changes in the profitability of crops associated with
(reduced) pesticide use and (increased) yields, relative to the conventional counterparts. Additional
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international trade literature on GMOs is in its infancy. Existing studies tend
to focus on the implications of country differences in GMO adoption for the
welfare of consumers, producers (i.e., farmers) and innovators (i.e., seed
firms), and for the trade and welfare of nations in aggregate (e.g., Tothova
and Oehmke 2004 and 2005; Anderson, Jackson, and Nielsen 2005; Hareau
et al. 2005; Lence and Hayes 2005; Frisvold, Reeves, and Tronstad 2006;
Plastina and Giannakas 2007; Veyssiere 2007; Anderson, Valenzuela, and
Jackson 2008; Anderson 2010; Choi 2010; and Swinnen and Vandemoortele
2011). The primary modeling approaches include computable general equi-
librium, game theory, and partial equilibrium models. Empirical trade stud-
ies of GMOs are few. This is due to the absence of data on GMO trade that
is distinct from traditional crops, and the absence of data on GMO regula-
tions. The latter data constraint has been recently addressed by Vigani,
Raimondi, and Olper (2012) who create an index measure of the stringency
of six types of GMO regulations for a sample of sixty countries. This meas-
ure allows for new empirical work and improves substantially on the ap-
proach of using dummy variables as policy measures.
Trade policy studies tend to be motivated by two real world observa-
tions.4 One is that countries differ dramatically in their policies toward
GMOs. Studies on this theme are motivated by the conflict between coun-
tries with relatively strict GMO policies (e.g., EU and Japan) vs. those with
more relaxed policies (e.g., the United States, Canada, Argentina, and
Brazil). The second observation is that countries make GMO adoption deci-
sions under alternative policy scenarios including those of their trading part-
ners. Studies on this issue are motivated by the dilemma faced by many
developing countries about whether to adopt GMOs when the policies of
their trading partners diverge. The dilemma is that such countries have an
interest in maintaining their export markets for non-GMO products to coun-
tries with restrictive GMO policies, while at the same time taking advantage
of GMO’s benefits.
The literature on GMOs in LA is relatively more developed given the re-
gion’s global dominance in GMO crop production and its complex policy
environment. This research includes country case studies that examine pol-
icy regimes or individual policy areas such as biosafety or intellectual prop-
erty rights (e.g., Qaim and de Janvry 2003 and 2005; Gaisford and Kerr 2004;
Falck-Zepeda et al. 2009; and Silva Gilli 2010; Mitre and Reis 2014).
However, to our knowledge there are no econometric studies for LA that
quantify the effects of GMO policies on bilateral trade. Our paper seeks to
fill this gap in the literature.
intangible impacts include the time savings to farmers, health and environmental consequences associ-
ated with changes in pesticide use, and biodiversity consequences. Consumption studies tend to focus on
the implications of GMOs for consumer preferences. These studies consider the characteristics of con-
sumer preferences that influence the acceptance or rejection of GMOs. Policy studies consider the eco-
nomic and political determinants and effects of GMO-related policies. Policy studies overlap extensively
with the consumption, production, and trade literatures. However, they also consider the “political econ-
omy” factors that influence policy adoption decisions, as well as the institutions for managing disputes.
For a literature review, see Qaim (2009).
4For a review of the recent literature, see Vigani and Olper (2015). For recent policy studies, see Basu
and Qaim (2007), Beckmann, Soregaroli, and Wesseler (2006), Desquilbet and Bullock (2009), Disdier
and Fontagne (2010), Gaisford, Hobbs, and Kerr (2007), Gruere (2006), Gruere, Carter, and Farzin
(2009), Just, Alston, and Zilberman (2006), Perez (2007), Pray, Bengali, and Ramaswami (2005), and
Young (2011).
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The contributions of our paper are most closely related to the research of
Vigani, Raimondi, and Olper (2012), who examine the effects of GMO policy
harmonization on bilateral trade globally. In contrast to their study, we
focus on LA, and particularly on Argentina and Brazil as leaders in the re-
gion. We examine the effects of importing countries’ GMO policies on the bi-
lateral exports of Argentina and Brazil. Our focus on Argentina and Brazil
has two important advantages. In contrast to Vigani, Raimondi, and Olper
(ibid), we can reasonably assume that the exports we examine are GMO in-
tensive, because more than 90% of soybean and maize production was
GMO in Argentina and Brazil during the years that we consider. This is im-
portant because trade data do not distinguish between GMO and traditional
crops. Second, our focus on Argentina and Brazil is advantageous because
these countries are leaders in the developing world in GMO adoption.
Currently, the fastest-growing GMO adopters are developing countries (i.e.,
China, Paraguay, Pakistan, South Africa, Uruguay, Philippines, and
Mexico), and these countries are looking for guidance on servicing trading
partners with diverse policies. Our study provides a benchmark for these
developing countries.
The purpose of our paper is to examine the exports of LA countries into a
global economy where countries differ in their GMO policies. We begin by
constructing measures of “revealed comparative advantage” using the
Balassa index. We use these measures to assess the comparative advantage
of LA countries in GMO industries relative to the region and relative to the
world. Second, we estimate the Gravity model of international trade. We
use this model to examine the effects of importing country differences in
GMO-related policies on the bilateral exports of Argentina and Brazil in soy-
beans and maize. Our overarching goal is to answer the question: To what
extent are GMO policies “trade related”?
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
examines the revealed comparative advantage of LA countries using the
Balassa index. The following section presents the theoretical model for
examining policies and bilateral trade. The subsequent section considers
econometric methods and data, followed by a section that presents the em-
pirical findings. The last section provides conclusions.
Revealed Comparative Advantage
In this section we examine the patterns of comparative advantage of LA
countries in the GMO industries. We use a measure of revealed comparative
advantage known as the Balassa index.5 This is an empirical measure of the
extent to which a given country specializes in the export of a particular
good, compared with a reference set of countries.
We calculate three alternative expressions of the Balassa index. Our base-
line is
RCAijw¼ ln ðXij=XitÞ  ln ðXwj=XwtÞ (1)
where RCAijw is the revealed comparative advantage of exporting country i
5The index of revealed comparative advantage originates from early work by Balassa (1965, 1989). More
recent extensions or adaptations of the index can be found in Yu, Cai, and Leung (2008).
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in industry j relative to the reference region w, Xij is the exports of country i
in industry j, Xit is total exports of country i in all industries, Xwj is world ex-
ports in industry j, and Xwt is total world exports in all industries. This index
reflects the share of industry j in country i’s total exports relative to the share
of industry j in total world exports. In this log form, the index values are
symmetric around 0. Values greater than 0 indicate a revealed comparative
advantage, and values less than 0 indicate a revealed comparative disadvan-
tage. Further, the larger the absolute value of the index, the stronger the ad-
vantage or disadvantage. In the baseline expression (1) the reference set of
countries is the world. Thus, RCA is defined for a given country relative to
the world.
Our second expression of the Balassa index is the “regional” expression
RCAijr ¼ ln ðXij=XitÞ  ln ðXrj=XrtÞ (2)
where r indexes a given region that we define as LA. Thus, Xrj is LA exports
in industry j, and Xrt is total LA exports in all industries. In expression (2),
index values greater than 0 indicate that country i has a RCA relative to all
countries in LA.6
Finally, we construct a variation of the Balassa index for internal trade
within LA. To this end, we redefine export (X) in expression (2) as exports to
destinations within LA. Thus, the numerator in equation (2) is the share of in-
dustry j in country i’s exports to other LA countries relative to the share of in-
dustry j in LA’s internal regional trade. In this third variation, RCA is defined
for a given country’s exports to LA, relative to all other countries in LA.
We use these variations of the Balassa index to answer three questions
with respect to the GMO industries: (1) What are the patterns of
comparative advantage of each Latin American country relative to the
world? (2) What are the patterns of comparative advantage of each Latin
American country relative to other countries in the region? (3) What are the
patterns of comparative advantage of each Latin American country in intra-
regional trade?
Table 1 reports the measures of RCA for 2011. Panel (a) shows countries’
RCA relative to the world. As shown, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay have
a strong RCA relative to the world in the broadest range of industries. This
RCA is particularly strong for Argentina in soya oil fractions (4.33); for
Brazil in soya beans (2.27); and for Paraguay in soya beans (4.14) and soya
oil fractions (4.11). In contrast, the other LA countries have a revealed com-
parative disadvantage in a majority of the industries. The exceptions are
that Uruguay has a RCA in soya beans (2.55), Bolivia in soya oil fractions
(3.32), Mexico and Colombia in maize flour (1.21 and 2.34), and Costa Rica
in maize flour (3.10) and soya oil fractions (0.16). These findings suggest
that all of the countries have a RCA in at least one of the GMO industries
relative to the world; and Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay are export
leaders.
Panel (b) reports countries’ revealed RCA relative to the LA region. As
one would expect, these values are more modest than those in panel (a) be-
cause the region as a whole has a RCA in the industries. Even so, the
6We define Latin America to include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Excluded countries have negli-
gible volumes of soybeans and maize exports (in 2011).
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Table 1 Revealed Comparative Advantage, 2011
(a) Relative to world
Crops Brazil Argentina Paraguay Uruguay Bolivia Mexico Colombia Chile Costa Rica
Maize unmilled 1.50 3.12 3.29 1.01 2.94 2.82 3.26 0.00 7.48
Maize (corn) flour 1.64 1.04 0.38 3.89 2.07 1.21 2.34 8.84 3.10
Soya beans 2.27 2.29 4.14 2.55 1.34 9.62 6.28 3.09 6.98
Soya oil, fractions 1.77 4.33 4.11 2.70 3.32 3.95 1.05 9.21 0.16
Cotton Seed 0.23 0.17 9.21 9.21 9.21 2.88 9.21 9.21 0.43
Cotton oil, fractions 0.08 2.56 0.82 9.21 9.21 5.56 5.36 9.21 9.21
Rape or colza 1.11 2.77 4.89 9.21 9.21 9.21 9.21 2.65 9.21
(b) Relative to Latin American region
Crops Brazil Argentina Paraguay Uruguay Bolivia Mexico Colombia Chile Costa Rica
Maize unmilled 0.26 1.88 2.05 2.25 4.18 4.07 4.50 1.24 8.72
Maize (corn) flour 0.43 0.17 1.59 5.11 3.28 0.01 1.13 10.05 1.89
Soya beans 0.90 0.92 2.78 1.19 2.71 10.98 7.64 4.46 8.35
Soya oil, fractions 0.41 2.15 1.93 4.88 1.14 6.13 3.23 9.21 2.02
Cotton Seed 1.06 0.66 9.21 9.21 9.21 2.05 9.21 9.21 0.40
Cotton oil, fractions 0.42 2.22 0.48 9.21 9.21 5.90 5.69 9.21 9.21
Rape or colza 2.31 1.57 3.69 9.21 9.21 9.21 9.21 1.45 9.21
(c) Intra-Regional trade in Latin America
Crops Brazil Argentina Paraguay Uruguay Bolivia Mexico Colombia Chile Costa Rica
Maize unmilled 0.95 1.05 1.76 5.65 4.17 2.56 4.50 4.84 9.21
Maize (corn) flour 1.09 0.12 9.21 9.21 1.05 4.21 0.10 9.21 0.30
Soya beans 3.74 0.80 3.53 1.18 1.39 9.21 9.21 9.21 9.21
Soya oil, fractions 1.62 0.99 1.06 5.25 1.42 5.74 2.47 9.21 2.99
Cotton Seed 0.55 0.51 9.21 9.21 9.21 9.21 9.21 9.21 5.92
Cotton oil, fractions 9.85 1.40 2.00 9.21 9.21 5.38 4.44 9.21 9.21
Rape or colza 2.12 1.12 2.79 9.21 9.21 9.21 9.21 9.21 9.21
Note: Panel (a) reports Balassa index shown in expression (1). Panel (b) reports Balassa index shown in expression (2).













patterns of RCA are similar to those in panel (a). With the exception of
Mexico, we find that each country has a RCA in at least one GMO industry
relative to other countries in LA. This result suggests a degree of specializa-
tion of countries within the LA region. However, when we compare the
signs of the index in panels (a) and (b), we see distinct patterns. For ex-
ample, Brazil has a RCA in soya oil fractions relative to the world (1.77), but
not relative to other countries in LA (0.41).
Finally, panel (c) reports countries’ RCA for intra-regional trade (the in-
ternal trade between LA countries). As shown, the index values in panel (c)
tend to be small relative to those in panel (b), reflecting that intra-regional
trade is more modest than external trade. We find that Argentina and
Paraguay are the prominent exporters to other countries within the region.
For example, Paraguay is the only country with a RCA in intra-regional
trade of soya beans (3.53). Thus, although Paraguay has a strong RCA in
this industry relative to the world (4.14) and relative to other LA countries
(2.78), much of its soya bean exports are destined for other countries in LA.
Of course, the propensity to export regionally makes sense considering
Paraguay’s landlocked location between Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia.
In summary, we find that all countries in LA have a RCA in at least one
GMO industry. Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay have the strongest RCA;
and Paraguay is unique in that a large volume of its exports are destined for
other countries in LA. These results reflect the patterns of trade as they cur-
rently exist, and highlight the countries that are strong stakeholders in the
GMO industries (e.g., Brazil and Argentina). However, these findings reflect
the export behavior of countries without reference to their trading partners.
In the remainder of the paper, we consider bilateral trade patterns and the
role of importer’s policies in shaping trade patterns.
Theoretical Model
Our theoretical framework is an adaptation of the Gravity model of inter-
national trade. This model provides a generalized framework consistent
with a variety of general equilibrium trade models.7 Research on the theory
foundations of the Gravity model has generated a well-established set of
predictions on the relationship between bilateral trade and country charac-
teristics. (For recent studies, see Anderson and van Wincoop 2003 and 2004;
Egger 2005; Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Chaney 2008; Helpman,
Melitz, and Rubinstein 2008; Baier and Bergstrand, 2009a, 2009b; Kleinert
and Toubal 2010; van Bergeijk and Brakman 2010; Bergstrand and Eggers
2011; Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch 2013). Policy variables are typically
added to the model to examine deviations from baseline trade flows.
7The Gravity model was originally introduced in international economics by Tinbergen (1962). Since
that time, economists have worked to establish a theoretical grounding for the expression and extensions
that account for a variety of real world behavior. For example, this research has examined border and
price effects, and compatibility of the Gravity model with the Heckscher-Ohlin model of inter-industry
trade and monopolistic competition models of intra-industry trade. Research has also examined the role of
distance as a “trade friction” as well as policy-based trade barriers and economic geography aspects of
distance and border effects.
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The empirical specification of the model has evolved as economists have
worked to establish its theoretical foundations.8 A common current expres-
sion that emerges from theory is
ln Tijk
 









where Tijk is bilateral trade in industry i from country j to country k, GDPj
and GDPk are the gross domestic products of countries j and k, respectively,
DISTjk is the bilateral distance between the economic centers of countries j and
k, ADJjk is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if both countries share a com-
mon border and 0 otherwise, LANGjk is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if
both countries share a common language and 0 otherwise, POLjk is the bilateral
difference between the policies of countries j and k, and ejk is a normally distrib-
uted error term.9 Equation (3) says that bilateral trade in industry (i) depends
on the GDP of the exporting and importing countries (j and k), the geographic
distance between the countries, their contiguity, differences in languages, and
differences in policies. Language serves as a measure of “cultural distance”,
while distance and contiguity are measures of geographic distance.
We adapt equation (3) in several ways for our application. First, we define
industries (i) to include soybeans and maize. We focus on these industries as
they have large shares of GMO content. For example, Argentina’s soybean
and maize production in 2013 was 100% and 97% GMO, respectively; and
Brazil’s soybean and maize production was 92% and 82% GMO, respect-
ively (see James 2013). We estimate equation (3) separately for these two
industries. Thus, Tijk is the bilateral trade of soybeans (or maize) from ex-
porting country j to importing country k. This definition is consistent with
the underlying theory, which predicts industry-level bilateral trade as a
function of country-level characteristics.
Second, we define the exporting countries (j) as Argentina and Brazil. We
focus on these two countries as our reference countries because they have a
strong comparative advantage in the GMO industries, and together exported
90% of the GMO-intensive exports from the region in 2011. We estimate equa-
tion (3) separately for these two countries. Thus, index j denotes Argentina
(or Brazil), while index k denotes each of the other countries in the world.
Since there is no variability across j, we can simplify equation (3) as
ln Tikð Þ ¼ b0 þ b1 ðlnGDPkÞ þ b2 ðlnDISTkÞ
þ b3 ADJkð Þ þ b4 LANGkð Þ þ b5 POLkð Þ þ ek
(4)
where Tik is the exports of Argentina (or Brazil) to countries k. Equation (4)
indicates that the bilateral exports of Argentina (or Brazil) in industry (i)
8Research on the theory foundations of the Gravity model considers the role of relative endowments (such
as land and labor and capital). For example, endowments-based trade models such as the Heckscher-
Ohlin model have been shown to be consistent with and/or nested within the Gravity model. In other
words, the supply-side effects of endowments are embedded in the Gravity specification that we use. We
have not added additional variables as we want our empirical specification to match the theory founda-
tions as closely as possible.
9See for example, Baier and Bergstrand (2009a and 2009b).
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depend on the characteristics of the importers including their GDP, their
geographic distance, contiguity, language, and policies.
Finally, we define the policy variable ðPOLk) as GMO-related policies
including the approval process, risk assessment, labeling, traceability re-
quirements, coexistence guidelines, membership to international agree-
ments, and intellectual property rights. We also consider a “policy regime”
variable that captures the composite of regulations.10
The parameters signs in equation (4) have the following interpretations.
As suggested by the underlying theory, we expect the parameter on GDP to
be positive, reflecting that economic size attracts bilateral flows.11 Second,
we expect the parameter on distance to be negative if trade costs increase
with geographic distance. The parameter on the distance can also provide a
sense for the degree of a country’s integration into the world economy. In
this case, a positive parameter on distance would reflect a high degree of
country integration (where the frictions associated with distance are negli-
gible). Third, we expect the parameter on adjacency to be positive if our refer-
ence countries tend to export to countries that share a common border and
negative otherwise.12 This would reflect a country’s high degree of eco-
nomic integration with its neighbors. Fourth, we expect the parameter on
language to be positive (negative) if our reference countries tend to export
to countries with similar (dissimilar) languages. Finally, the signs of the pol-
icy parameters depend on whether the specific policy serves as a barrier or
attractor to bilateral trade flows, which we will determine empirically.
The magnitudes of the parameters of equation (4) reflect elasticities or
ratios of percentage changes. These parameters are comparable across refer-
ence countries and industries, and can be interpreted as the responsiveness
of bilateral trade to the explanatory variables.13
Finally, for the purpose of sensitivity analysis, we consider three other
variations of equation (4) that are common in the Gravity model literature:
ln Tikð Þ ¼ b0 þ b1 ðlnGDPkÞ þ b2 ðlnPOPk Þ þ b3 ðlnDISTkÞ
þ b4 ADJkð Þ þ b5 LANGkð Þ þ b6 POLkð Þ þ ejk
(5)
ln Tikð Þ ¼ d0 þ d1 ðlnGDPkÞ þ d2 ðlnGDPk=POPk Þ þ d3 ðlnDISTkÞ
þ d4 ADJkð Þ þ d5 LANGkð Þ þ d6 POLkð Þ þ ejk
(6)
10It is plausible that countries with strict policies simply produce domestically rather than importing. As
shown in appendix B, the countries with the strictest policies include Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic,
France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. As shown in appendix A, these
same countries tend to have modest-to-no imports of soybean and maize from Argentina and Brazil.
Studies of the theoretical foundations of the Gravity model demonstrate how supply and demand-side fea-
tures underlie the trade equation that we estimate. In our specifications, these net effects of policies are
captured in the parameter on the policy regime and individual policy variable. The negative parameter re-
flects the negative effect of a country’s strict policies on her imports.
11In some theoretical expressions of the Gravity model where GDP represents income, the parameter on
GDP can take a negative sign. In this exception, the income of the foreign destination has a negative effect
on their demand for imports.
12Since we control for geographic distance, the contiguity variable captures conditions beyond those asso-
ciated with transportation costs.
13For example, the magnitudes of the parameters on the policy variables help us to gauge the size of the
impact of the policies on bilateral trade flows in terms of percentage changes.
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ln Tikð Þ ¼ c0 þ c1 ðlnPOPkÞ þ c2 ðlnGDPk=POPk Þ þ c3 ðlnDISTkÞ
þ c4 ADJkð Þ þ c5 LANGkð Þ þ c6 POLkð Þ þ ejk:
(7)
In equation (5), the concept of economic size (i.e., mass) is represented by
population (POPkÞ in addition to GDPk. The population variable is typically
interpreted as “market size” and the associated parameter is expected to be
positive. The intuition is that a larger market size in the destination country
results in larger bilateral trade flows to that destination.14 Alternatively,
in equations (6) and (7), economic size is represented by GDPk and
GDPk=POPk; and POPk and GDPk=POPk, respectively. These equations are
alternative expressions of the same relationship, and thus their parameters
are transformations on one another.
We apply equations (4–7) to examine the following questions: (1) What
are the baseline determinants of bilateral trade? (2) Do policies cause devi-
ations from the baseline bilateral trade flows? (3) If so, are the policy effects
positive or negative?
Method and Data
The econometric method involves estimating equations (4–7) for
Argentina and Brazil, in the industries of soybeans and maize. We use
cross-section data where Argentina or Brazil is the reference exporting
country and their trading partners are the importing countries that com-
prise the rest of the world. We pool the data across three years (2008,
2011, and 2014) to create a panel. To control for inflation, all value data
are in 2010 constant dollars. In contrast, the data on GMO policies are
available for only a single year (2007). Thus, using the pooled data we
examine the effects of policy adoption (in 2007) on trade behavior (on
average, over 2008, 2011, and 2014). One important advantage of the lag
between policy and trade is that past policies are expected to be exogen-
ous with respect to future trade. Below we report results generated using
the pooled data, as well as a sensitivity analysis using the individual
cross-sections for each of the three years. A comparison of years allows
us to further assess policy endogeneity, lagged policy effects, and time
and country factors that affect trade.
We use three alternative estimation techniques including OLS, Tobit,
and Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood. We explore these alternatives in
order to address the presence of a non-trivial number of zero values for bi-
lateral trade. In our context, the zero observations represent actual zero
trade rather than missing values. Further, since we anchor our exporter to
a single reference country, we consider only the exports of that country
and not imports (which conceptually would be a negative trade flow). This
choice is appropriate given the strong RCA of our reference countries
(Argentina and Brazil) in the industries (soybeans and maize). The litera-
ture provides several methods for treating zero observations in such a con-
text. One approach is to use OLS and assign small values to zero
observations such that the log of these values is defined. A second ap-
proach is to estimate the log linear form of the model using Tobit methods,
14In some theory frameworks, it is possible for the parameter on population to take a negative sign if an
import substitution effect is stronger than the market size effect.
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which allows for censoring at zero. A third alternative is to estimate the
model using the export values measured in levels and then implement a
Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator, traditionally used
in count regression models (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006). As the
PPML approach is now standard in the recent Gravity literature, we report
findings generated using this technique. We reference the OLS and Tobit
results in our sensitivity analysis.
The data include measures of trade, core variables, and policies. The trade
data include data to construct the Balassa index and data for the regression
analysis. The former are the U.S. dollar value of LA countries’ exports to the
world in aggregate, while the latter are the dollar value of bilateral exports
from Argentina and Brazil to the 58 importers for which comparable data
are available. These data are detailed by industry and year (2008, 2011, and
2014).15 The industries include maize and soybeans.16 All trade data are
from the Comtrade database of the United Nations. As noted earlier, these
data do not distinguish between GMO and traditional crops, as such data
are not available. However, the industries and reference countries we con-
sider are those with the largest shares of GMO content. For Argentina and
Brazil, more than 90% of soybean and maize production was GMO during
the years we consider. Thus, we can reasonably assume their exports are
“GMO-intensive.” Appendix A reports select country data on bilateral trade
in 2011 and descriptive statistics.
The data on core variables include GDP and population from the World
Development Indicators published by the World Bank (2015). GDP is meas-
ured in U.S. dollars for 2008, 2011, and 2014. The core variables also include
distance, contiguity, and common language from the Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (2006). Distance is measured
as kilometers between the economic centers of country pairs. Contiguity is a
dummy variable taking a value of one if country pairs share a common bor-
der. Common language is a dummy variable taking a value of one if country
pairs share a common language.
Data on policies include measures of intellectual property rights (IPRs)
and GMO policies. The data on IPR policies is the index constructed by Park
(2008). This index measures the strength of countries’ patent policies based
on the following: their extent of coverage in eight technology areas; length
of protection; membership in five international treaties that address patents;
provisions for loss of protection including working requirement, compul-
sory licensing, and revocation of patents; and enforcement mechanisms
including preliminary pre-trial injunctions, contributory infringement, and
burden of proof. Country scores range from 0 to 1 in each category based on
the strength of laws. The composite index is the un-weighted sum of the
scores in the five categories. The index ranges from 0 to 5 with higher values
indicating stronger patent protections. These data are available on a 5-year
basis. We use the index for 2010.
Finally, the data on GMO policies are the recently released measures de-
veloped by Vigani, Raimondi, and Olper (2012). This index is based on laws
and acts regulating GMO production, commercialization, and trade as of
15The countries include all those for which comparable data are available. When appropriate, we deflate
the data into constant 2010 dollars to control for the effects of inflation across time.
16These aggregate industries are defined using the SITC Revision 3 classification system as follows:
Maize: 044; and Soybeans: 2222.
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2007. The data covers six categories of regulation: approval process, risk as-
sessment, labeling policies, traceability requirements, coexistence guidelines,
and membership in international agreements. The composite index is the
sum of scores in each category normalized to the range [0,1]. In our analysis
we use the component scores to measure the distinct regulations and the
composite index to measure the policy regime. Higher scores reflect more re-
strictive regulations. That is, countries with higher scores take a more pre-
ventative (anti-GMO) approach and those with lower scores take a more
promotional (pro-GMO) approach. Appendix B reports the policy data and
descriptive statistics. As shown, although the range is modest, there is con-
siderable variability across countries.
The interpretation of this variability is as follows. The approval process
reflects the country’s approach to assessing product risk. Country policies
range from the absence of approval procedures to mandatory processes
based on the substantial equivalence principle, to mandatory processes
based on the precautionary principle, to complete bans on GMOs. Second,
risk assessment reflects the extent to which an evaluation process for GMO
products is implemented. Country policies range from the absence of risk
analysis, to proposed risk assessment without enforcement, to mandatory
risk assessment, to complete bans on GMOs. Third, labeling concerns the in-
formation provided to buyers/consumers about the contents of a product.
Country policies range from the absence of GMO labeling regulations, to
voluntary labeling, to mandatory labeling with high thresholds, to manda-
tory labeling with low thresholds, to complete bans on GMOs. Fourth, trace-
ability pertains to the ability to identify the origin, history or use of a
product, such as the location of the field it came from, using a registered
identification. Country policies range from the absence of processes for
GMO traceability, to traceability requirements without enforcement, to man-
datory traceability, to complete bans on GMOs. Fifth, coexistence concerns
rules designed to preserve the identity of traditional crops vs. GMO crops.
Country policies range from the absence of coexistence rules, to coexistence
policies that are unenforced, to partial guidelines for coexistence, to exhaust-
ive guidelines on coexistence, to complete bans of GMOs. Finally, country
memberships to international agreements include the Cartagena Protocol
and Codex Alimentarius. Countries that are signatories to these agreements
are considered to have relatively stronger regulatory environments.
Appendix C provides additional descriptions of country and regional pat-
terns of policy strength.
Results
This section reports the regression results. Specifically, we report esti-
mates of Gravity equations (4) through (7) and examine the parameter sign
for their consistency with the underlying theory.
Baseline
To begin, we estimate the baseline specification (without policy variables)
to assess the question: What are the baseline determinants of bilateral trade?
Table 2 reports PPML estimates of the Gravity model for the three-year
panel (2008, 2011, and 2014). The columns correspond with equations (4–7)
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Table 2. Baseline Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Gravity Model, 2008–2014
Variable
Argentina (Soybeans) Argentina (Maize) Brazil (Soybeans) Brazil (Maize)
Eq (4) Eq (5) Eq (6) Eq (7) Eq (4) Eq (5) Eq (6) Eq (7) Eq (4) Eq (5) Eq (6) Eq (7) Eq (4) Eq (5) Eq (6) Eq (7)
Constant 76.10** 75.99** 55.95** 113.48 9.64 9.59 10.80* 10.05 36.46** 36.46** 26.63** 23.21 12.37* 11.96 12.98* 13.05*
(13.89) (14.16) (17.16) (72.63) (6.19) (6.68) (6.14) (7.90) (13.53) (13.44) (12.65) (14.67) (7.98) (8.10) (7.79) (7.72)
GDP 1.34** 1.19** 1.52** 0.32** 0.24 0.41** 1.19** 1.20** 1.25** 0.34* 0.32 0.33**
(0.29) (0.32) (0.25) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.26) (0.22) (0.23) (0.17) (0.20) (0.17)
POP 0.45** 0.73** 0.13 0.26* 0.02 0.61** 0.04 0.30*
(0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17)
GDP/POP 0.91** 0.07 0.24 0.11 0.43 0.35 0.03 0.32
(0.34) (0.37) (0.19) (0.16) (0.27) (0.23) (0.21) (0.27)
Distance 5.93** 5.74** 4.29** 11.90 0.65 0.62 0.72 0.42 2.46** 2.46** 1.71 2.66* 1.64** 1.60* 1.69* 1.77**
(1.17) (1.16) (1.58) (7.78) (0.75) (0.78) (0.71) (0.82) (1.10) (1.10) (1.10) (1.61) (0.94) (0.93) (0.88) (0.88)
Adjacency 10.78** 10.27** 7.73** 23.16 1.72 1.61 1.79 1.19 0.50 0.47 1.52 2.82 2.34** 2.23** 2.41** 2.02*
(2.69) (2.73) (3.53) (16.48) (1.31) (1.40) (1.19) (1.45) (1.69) (1.59) (1.69) (1.90) (1.09) (1.14) (1.06) (1.14)
Language 3.25** 3.51** 3.40** 6.81 1.43** 1.32** 1.28* 1.32* 2.96** 2.94** 2.87** 1.67** 1.79** 1.80** 1.80** 1.77**
(1.08) (1.11) (1.16) (4.47) (0.55) (0.64) (0.66) (0.74) (1.06) (1.14) (0.98) (0.70) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.50)
R-squared 0.79 0.90 0.96 0.73 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.17 0.68 0.68 0.84 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09
N 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174
Note:
Data are a panel of country cross-sections for 2008, 2011, and 2014. All value data are in constant 2010 dollars.
Endogenous variable is bilateral exports (Tik), detailed by industry (maize and soybeans) and by exporting country (Argentina and Brazil).
All regressions include time-fixed effects.












for Argentina or Brazil in the industries of soybeans or maize. The results
for equation (4) show that the GDP of importers has a positive effect on their
bilateral inflows of soybeans and maize from Argentina and Brazil.
Similarly, the results for equation (5) show that the population of importers
also has a positive effect on bilateral inflows. These results are consistent
with the underlying theory and intuition that economic/market size attracts
bilateral inflows. Since equations (6) and (7) are alternative expressions of
equation (5), the parameters are transformations of one another. We find
that the estimates of equations (5–7) take the expected signs and relative
magnitudes in relation to one another.
Next, we consider the estimates on adjacency, distance, and language.
Table 2 shows that significant estimates on adjacency are positive. This result
suggests that Argentina and Brazil tend to export to geographically nearby
countries inside the contiguous region.17 This is expected, as economic inte-
gration with neighboring countries is relatively strong. Table 2 also shows
that significant estimates on distance are positive. This finding suggests that
Argentina and Brazil are highly integrated into the external world economy
in the industries of soybeans and maize. Consequently, after controlling for
adjacency, geographic distance does not serve as a friction to bilateral flows.
Finally, table 2 shows that significant estimates on language take the ex-
pected positive sign. This finding suggests that similarity in language tends
to enhance bilateral trade flows, reflecting relatively strong cultural ties.
Thus, we conclude that our baseline results are consistent with expect-
ations based on underlying theory.
Policy Analysis
Next, we estimate the extended specification (with the policy variables) to
assess the question: Do policies cause deviations from the baseline bilateral
trade flows? If so, are the policy effects positive or negative? Tables 3–6 re-
port the PPML estimates of the Gravity model using the pooled data for
2008, 2011, and 2014. Tables 3 and 4 focus on Argentina’s bilateral exports
of soybeans and maize, respectively; while tables 5 and 6 focus on Brazil’s
bilateral exports of soybeans and maize, respectively. In each table, we con-
sider the individual policies one at a time and then jointly.18
Table 3 reports estimates for Argentina’s bilateral exports of soybeans. The
results show that significant estimates on policies take negative signs. The
policies that have an effect include risk assessment, traceability, coexistence
guidelines, and intellectual property rights. In other words, the strength of
importers’ policies has an overwhelmingly negative effect on the bilateral
exports of Argentina in soybeans. Table 3 also shows a negative and signifi-
cant estimate on the GMO index, suggesting that Argentina tends to export
less to importers with strong policy regimes. The last column of table 3 shows
that when all policies are considered jointly, risk assessment, traceability, and
intellectual property rights have the strongest negative effects.19
17Argentina is adjacent to Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile, while Brazil is adjacent to
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, and Uruguay.
18The number of observations (N) varies across the policy regressions because the data on intellectual
property rights and GMO policies come from different sources and consequently the country coverage
differs slightly.
19This is consistent with expectations because the strength of intellectual property rights tends to be posi-
tively correlated with the strength of GMO policies.
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Table 3 Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Gravity Model for Argentina’s Bilateral Soybean Exports, 2008–2014
Variable ________________Argentina’s Bilateral Soybean Exports________
Constant 96.05** 87.87** 80.50** 72.98** 57.93** 70.77** 75.47** 76.35** 39.32**
(15.99) (18.49) (14.20) (12.51) (11.03) (10.17) (15.66) (12.63) (17.11)
GDP 1.86** 1.62** 1.77** 1.11** 1.41** 1.32** 1.33** 2.07** 1.49**
(0.32) (0.39) (0.45) (0.35) (0.22) (0.21) (0.30) (0.51) (0.31)
Distance 7.27** 6.71** 5.88** 5.95** 3.97** 5.49** 5.86** 5.21** 2.04
(1.28) (1.34) (1.07) (1.54) (1.17) (0.99) (1.43) (1.17) (2.09)
Adjacency 14.05** 12.77** 11.11** 10.41** 6.20** 9.46** 10.62** 8.23** 1.72
(3.26) (3.36) (2.56) (3.26) (2.99) (2.47) (3.36) (2.92) (5.46)
Language 5.13** 3.96** 3.87** 2.79** 3.23** 2.59** 3.19** 3.75** 2.03
(1.38) (1.24) (1.23) (1.05) (1.27) (1.06) (1.24) (1.14) (2.02)
GMO Index 8.91**
(3.06)
Approval Process 2.79 0.92
(1.98) (1.99)






Coexistence Guidelines 4.80** 0.87
(1.46) (1.64)
International Agreements 0.21 2.00
(1.60) (2.47)
Intellectual Property Rights 2.08** 0.31*
(0.80) (0.58)
R-squared 0.97 0.81 0.82 0.91 0.98 0.98 0.79 0.95 0.99
N 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 168 168
Note:
Data are a panel of country cross-sections for 2008, 2011, and 2014. All value data are in constant 2010 dollars.
Endogenous variable is bilateral exports (Tik) of Argentina in Soybeans.
All regressions include time-fixed effects.












Table 4 Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates of Gravity model for Argentina’s bilateral maize exports, 2008-2014
Variable Argentina’s Bilateral Maize Exports
Constant 8.00 9.61 8.10 6.79 8.87 10.84* 9.65 9.53 12.14*
(6.73) (7.14) (5.33) (7.24) (7.06) (5.86) (6.25) (7.64) (6.49)
GDP 0.33** 0.32** 0.35** 0.34** 0.33** 0.28** 0.32** 0.49** 0.43**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15)
Distance 0.45 0.65 0.48 0.35 0.57 0.67 0.65 0.69 0.85
(0.77) (0.88) (0.63) (0.81) (0.79) (0.66) (0.74) (0.85) (0.64)
Adjacency 1.33 1.72 1.25 0.87 1.52 1.85 1.72 1.45 1.52
(1.35) (1.41) (1.11) (1.64) (1.37) (1.14) (1.35) (1.58) (1.56)
Language 1.39** 1.42** 1.48** 1.53** 1.35 1.07* 1.43** 1.12 0.89



















International Agreements 0.02 0.35
(1.18) (1.19)
Intellectual Property Rights 0.78** 0.85**
(0.37) (0.39)
R-squared 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.30
N 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 168 168
Note:
Data are a panel of country cross-sections for 2008, 2011, and 2014. All value data are in constant 2010 dollars.
Endogenous variable is bilateral exports (Tik) of Argentina in Maize.
All regressions include time-fixed effects.













Table 5 Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates of Gravity model for Brazil’s bilateral soybean exports, 2008-2014
Variable Brazil’s Bilateral Soybean Exports
Constant 36.23** 33.69** 36.41** 36.75** 33.22** 37.59** 32.79** 34.46** 19.85**
(13.77) (11.22) (13.41) (6.84) (11.18) (11.58) (10.72) (12.33) (7.85)
GDP 1.19** 1.25** 1.20** 1.20** 1.19** 1.17** 1.30** 1.41** 1.20**
(0.27) (0.31) (0.29) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21) (0.33) (0.35) (0.25)
Distance 2.42** 1.61 2.46** 2.06** 2.15** 2.66** 1.50 2.12** 0.49
(1.11) (1.10) (1.11) (0.88) (1.01) (1.02) (1.17) (1.06) (1.04)
Adjacency 0.48 0.76 0.54 0.81 1.18 0.47 1.58 1.35 2.60
(1.67) (1.67) (1.59) (1.40) (1.55) (1.57) (1.41) (1.58) (1.61)
Language 2.86** 2.38** 2.99** 2.20** 3.29** 3.94** 2.45** 3.40** 2.11**
(1.42) (0.92) (1.17) (0.69) (1.18) (1.46) (0.88) (1.27) (0.92)
GMO Index 0.35
(2.29)
Approval Process 5.53 2.36
(4.18) (1.79)






Coexistence Guidelines 1.52 0.74
(1.25) (1.27)
International Agreements 3.17 2.67*
(2.60) (1.58)
Intellectual Property Rights 0.81 0.50
(0.61) (0.70)
R-squared 0.66 0.73 0.68 0.93 0.84 0.86 0.74 0.80 0.95
N 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 168 168
Note:
Data are a panel of country cross-sections for 2008, 2011, and 2014. All value data are in constant 2010 dollars.
Endogenous variable is bilateral exports (Tik) of Brazil in Soybeans.
All regressions include time-fixed effects.












Table 6 Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates of Gravity model for Brazil’s bilateral maize exports, 2008-2014
Variable Brazil’s Bilateral Maize Exports
Constant 14.06* 12.36 11.82 13.57 6.77** 13.20* 13.18 10.12 20.20**
(7.46) (7.91) (8.32) (8.37) (5.94) (7.42) (8.18) (8.90) (9.72)
GDP 0.31* 0.34** 0.39** 0.31* 0.31** 0.33* 0.34* 0.41* 0.48**
(0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22)
Distance 1.84** 1.64* 1.54 1.79* 2.14** 1.74* 1.58 1.39 2.31
(0.92) (0.89) (0.94) (1.00) (0.82) (0.94) (0.99) (1.02) (1.21)
Adjacency 2.75** 2.33** 2.12* 2.70** 3.26** 2.53** 2.19** 1.81 3.26
(1.06) (1.02) (1.17) (1.15) (0.92) (1.14) (1.08) (1.31) (1.55)
Language 1.61** 1.80** 1.89** 1.71** 1.67** 1.57** 1.62** 1.86** 1.92*
(0.53) (0.55) (0.53) (0.53) (0.50) (0.55) (0.50) (0.53) (0.76)
GMO Index 0.99
(0.98)
Approval Process 0.02 0.94
(0.82) (2.22)






Coexistence Guidelines 0.50 0.49
(0.77) (1.22)
International Agreements 1.54 1.20
(1.41) (1.08)
Intellectual Property Rights 0.36 0.64
(0.40) (0.47)
R-squared 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.13
N 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 168 168
Note:
Data are a panel of country cross-sections for 2008, 2011, and 2014. All value data are in constant 2010 dollars.
Endogenous variable is bilateral exports (Tik) of Brazil in Maize.
All regressions include time-fixed effects.













These findings on GMO policies are consistent with Vigani, Raimondi,
and Olper (2012) who show that bilateral differences across countries in
GMO regulations negatively affect trade. While these authors focus on bilat-
eral trade between all countries, we focus on the bilateral exports of our two
reference countries (i.e., Argentina and Brazil) to all importers. Our results
show that either Argentinean soybean exporters factor regulatory differ-
ences into their decisions on where to export, or soybean importers factor
GMO-content into their decisions over which countries to import from.
Either way, the significant negative effects on trade (quantified here) suggest
that policy makers need to consider more than domestic impacts when for-
mulating GMO policies.
In contrast, tables (4–6) overwhelmingly show insignificant estimates on
the policy variables in the regressions for Argentina and Brazil’s maize ex-
ports, and Brazil’s soybean exports. In other words, policies do not tend to
cause deviations in bilateral flows away from the baseline in these cases.
There are three exceptions. The first is that Argentina’s bilateral exports of
maize are negatively related to strong intellectual property rights in impor-
ters. Second, Brazil’s bilateral exports of soybeans are positively related to
strong labeling policies in importers. Third, Brazil’s bilateral exports of
maize are positively related to the strength of traceability policies in impor-
ters. The intuition for these exceptions will become clear when we consider
changes in the effects of policies over time.
When we compare the findings (in tables 3–6), we see that Argentinean
soybean trade is much more sensitive to importers’ policies than are
Argentinean maize or Brazilian soybeans and maize. One explanation is
that there is a higher concentration of GMO content in soybeans. One hun-
dred percent of Argentinean soybeans are GMO, and this has been the case
for over ten years, according to James (2013). In contrast, Argentinean maize
and Brazilian soybeans and maize have only recently seen rising GMO lev-
els. For example, Argentinean maize was just 50% GMO in 2004, and only
reached 80% in 2009. Only 8% of Brazil’s soybean and maize output was
GMO in 2005. In 2010, this value had climbed to 48%, and currently stands
at around 87%.20 Accordingly, the significant effects seen for Argentina’s
soybeans may be predictive of effects that will emerge in the future as im-
porters adjust to the increasing GMO content in Argentinean maize and
Brazilian soybeans and maize.
Extensions: Sensitivity Analysis
This section considers four extensions. First, are GMO policies endogen-
ous with respect to bilateral trade flows? The intuition is that countries that
are large importers in the GMO industries would tend to adopt pro-GMO
policies. In our context, pro-GMO policies correspond with weak regula-
tions. If policies are endogenous with respect to trade, we would expect the
estimates on the policy variables to be biased such that they are larger in ab-
solute value. That is, we may conclude that weak regulations in importing
countries serve as a stronger attractor to bilateral trade flows than they actu-
ally do. The issue of policy endogeneity in international trade studies is typ-
ically addressed using instrumental variables and/or lagged measures of
policy. In our specifications, however, policy endogeneity is less likely
20For further details, see James (2013).
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because we anchor our exporters to single countries (i.e., Argentina and
Brazil). That is, it is less likely that a single country’s pattern of bilateral ex-
ports influences the variability of policy strength across all importers.
Rather, we expect importers’ policies to be sensitive to their trade with all
major trading partners. However, since Argentina and Brazil have a strong
comparative advantage in soybeans and maize, it is possible that importers’
trade reliance on these countries influences their policies. Thus, we take a
conservative approach and use lagged policy measures from 2007, which
precede trade in 2008, 2011, and 2014. We do not expect future trade to have
a strong influence on the adoption of past policies.
Second, we perform a lagged policy experiment that allows us to further
assess endogeneity and also determine the character of any lag between
GMO policies and their effects on trade. To this end, we re-estimate the ex-
pressions of the Gravity model shown in tables 3–6; however, we now use
cross-sections for individual years rather than the pooled data. The new re-
gressions correspond with one, four, and seven-year lags between 2007 poli-
cies and 2008, 2011, and 2014 trade, respectively. 21 It is not likely that trade
in 2011 and 2014 influences past 2007 policies; however, it is plausible that
2008 trade influences 2007 policies, as policy makers may anticipate trade re-
liance in the near future. The intuition for this approach is that the longer
the lag, the more exogenous the policy with respect to trade. If endogeneity
is present, we would expect the parameter on the policy variables to be
larger in absolute value, and for this bias to diminish as the lag increases.
Before undertaking the lagged analysis, we employ the Hausman test to dir-
ectly assess endogeneity. Appendix D reports the Hausman test statistics.
We find weak-to-no evidence of endogeneity, with only two exceptions.22
Table 7 reports the results of the lagged approach. For simplicity, we re-
port only the estimates on the policy variables. For example, the estimates in
the first column correspond with eight different regressions, where each pol-
icy variable is considered one at a time. Further, in the 2008 columns, there
is a one-year lag between 2007 policies and 2008 trade. In the 2011 columns,
there is a four-year lag between 2007 policies and 2011 trade. In the 2014 col-
umns, there is a seven-year lag between 2007 policies and 2014 trade.
Columns 1–6 report the findings for Argentina. As shown, the estimates
on the policy variables tend to be negative and significant for Argentina’s
soybean and maize exports. Further, the significant estimates for soybeans
tend to be smaller in absolute value in 2008 relative to the latter years (col-
umns 1–3); the significant estimates for maize tend to be insignificant in
2008 and 2011 and significant in 2014 (columns 4–6). These findings suggest
that the effects of importers’ policies are larger and/or more statistically sig-
nificant when the lag between policy adoption and trade is longer (e.g., four
to seven years). These results run counter to the effects of endogeneity.
21We convert all value data into 2010 constant dollars to control for the effects of inflation across time.
This allows us to compare the results across time (i.e., 2008, 2011, and 2014).
22We apply the common approach that compares the parameters of random and fixed effects specifica-
tions. The null is that these parameters are equivalent. We find weak or no evidence of endogeneity (with
only two exceptions). Specifically, we find that for Argentina’s soybean trade, the null is rejected at the
10% level but not the 5% level, suggesting weak evidence of policy endogenity. For Argentina’s maize
trade, we again find weak evidence of endogeneity for all policies, except for coexistence guidelines and
intellectual property rights. For these two exceptions, the null is rejected at the 5% level, suggesting
endogeneity. Finally, for Brazil’s soybean and maize trade, we find no evidence of endogeneity.
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Table 7 Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates of Gravity model, by year for 2008, 2011 and 2014
Argentina Brazil
__________Soybeans__________ __________Maize__________ __________Soybeans__________ __________Maize__________
2008 2011 2014 2008 2011 2014 2008 2011 2014 2008 2011 2014
GMO Index 4.85** 11.07** 8.79** 1.09 1.52 3.49** 3.71** 1.15 0.26 3.30** 2.06* 0.79
(2.18) (3.65) (2.81) (1.57) (1.60) (0.79) (1.86) (2.90) (2.60) (1.65) (1.19) (1.32)
Approval Process 3.51** 2.54 3.63 0.82 0.46 2.00** 6.41** 4.08 4.91 2.51 0.57 0.21
(1.53) (2.84) (2.33) (1.11) (1.48) (0.93) (3.04) (3.38) (4.06) (2.20) (0.84) (0.90)
Risk Assessment 3.20* 5.90 10.69** 1.99 0.47 2.24 2.32** 1.27 1.78 1.11 0.07 1.35
(1.79) (3.96) (3.78) (1.58) (1.74) (1.53) (0.96) (1.96) (2.37) (1.56) (1.82) (1.61)
Labeling 2.76** 5.82 2.08 0.81 1.28 1.61* 3.25* 7.67** 5.19** 3.93** 0.76 0.62
(1.28) (3.86) (2.52) (1.09) (1.42) (0.86) (1.75) (2.60) (1.55) (1.55) (0.70) (1.72)
Traceability 2.87** 6.98** 5.52** 1.60* 1.98** 1.72** 2.35* 1.98 1.53 2.48** 1.70** 0.73
(1.13) (1.64) (1.36) (0.93) (0.94) (0.74) (1.32) (1.28) (1.10) (1.18) (0.77) (0.76)
Coexistence Guidelines 2.14 7.52** 4.15** 0.02 2.31 4.93** 0.98 2.62** 1.70 0.90 1.02 0.38
(1.38) (1.71) (1.54) (1.03) (1.98) (2.05) (1.01) (1.30) (1.24) (0.98) (0.82) (0.92)
International Agreements 0.29 1.00 0.65 0.31 0.73 0.73 2.25 3.03 3.09 3.66 1.14 1.71
(1.24) (1.88) (2.55) (1.29) (1.44) (1.04) (2.73) (2.59) (2.51) (2.63) (1.40) (1.51)
Intellectual Property Rights 0.96** 2.64** 2.30** 0.10 1.11** 0.89** 0.24 1.04 0.95 0.12 0.18 0.44
(0.22) (1.23) (0.72) (0.88) (0.42) (0.39) (0.71) (0.72) (0.62) (0.76) (0.59) (0.43)
Note:
Data are cross-sections for the years 2008, 2011, and 2014. All value data are in constant 2010 dollars.
Endogenous variable is bilateral exports (Tik), detailed by industry (maize and soybeans), exporting country (Argentina and Brazil), and Year (2008, 2011, 2014).
All regressions include time-fixed effects.












Instead, the findings suggest that past policy decisions serve as a stronger
determinant of future bilateral trade.
Columns 7–12 report the related findings for Brazil. As shown, the esti-
mates on the policy variables tend to be significant and positive for 2008
and insignificant for 2011 and 2014.23 This pattern is evident for Brazil’s ex-
ports of both soybeans and maize. These findings suggest that Brazil tends
to export more soybeans and maize to countries with relatively strong GMO
policies in 2008, but not thereafter. This finding could potentially suggest
evidence of policy endogeneity for Brazil. However, a review of the underly-
ing data suggests that trade patterns were changing between 2008 and 2014
as the GMO shares of soybean and maize increased dramatically in Brazil.
Indeed, the data show that Brazil’s exports to EU countries (where policies
are stronger) decreased after 2008, while Brazil’s exports to Asia (where pol-
icies are weaker) increased. This pattern in the data suggests that changes in
GMO content prompted Brazil to search for import markets with pro-GMO
policies.
Third, we ask whether the trade effects of GMO policies change over
time? To answer this question, we estimate a variation of the Gravity model
where we account for deviations in policy effects between the three equilib-
rium points in time. Specifically, we interact the policy variables with a time
dummy to generate parameters representing the deviation in policy effects
for the given year. We expect these parameters to be statistically different
from one another if the trade effects of policies change over time. Appendix
E reports the PPML (and Tobit) estimates of deviations in the trade effects of
GMO policies over time. For Argentina, the findings show that the negative
trade effects of strong policies among importers tend to increase over time.
(This finding is particularly pronounced in the Tobit regressions.) For Brazil,
the findings are more mixed; they show that the positive trade effects of
strong policies among importers tend to decrease over time, and in some
cases become negative, as GMO content rises. Thus, we anticipate that fu-
ture strengthening of GMO policies in importers would adversely affect
Argentina and Brazil’s export opportunities.
Finally, we consider the robustness of our results along several dimen-
sions. To this end, we estimate all of the reported regressions using Tobit
and OLS techniques in addition to the reported PPML method. Appendices
F and G report the Tobit and OLS estimates that are comparable to the
PPML estimates in tables 3–7. While the quantitative results differ across
methods (as expected), the qualitative results are indeed robust. Second, we
assess the sensitivity of all of the reported results to time factors that could
potentially affect trade. One potentially important time factor is weather
and/or crop shortages. Such conditions could affect multiple countries in a
given year and/or affect a given country over multiple years. We can con-
trol for the former using time-fixed effects, which we include in all reported
regressions. We find that the parameter signs, relative magnitudes, and fit
of the regressions are insensitive to the inclusion of time-fixed effects. This is
not to say that weather and crop shortages on not important to trade, but
23There are several additional findings. For example, Brazil tends to export more soybeans to countries
with relatively strong labeling policies in all years and less to countries with relatively weak co-existence
guidelines in 2011. Also, Brazil tends to export more maize to countries with relatively strong traceabil-
ity regulations in 2008 and 2011, although the magnitude of this effect is diminishing. This cross-year
variability is consistent with Brazil’s dramatically changing GMO content and shifting trade patterns
during the period examined.
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rather that our results are robust with respect to such conditions that occur
in a given year.
Concluding Remarks
The purpose of our paper is to examine the exports of LA countries into a
global economy where countries differ in GMO-related policies. We began
by constructing measures of “revealed comparative advantage” using the
Balassa index. We used these measures to assess the RCA of LA countries in
GMO industries relative to the region and relative to the world. We found
that all LA countries have a RCA in at least one GMO industry relative to
the world; and Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay are export leaders in the
broadest range of these industries. We also found that almost all LA coun-
tries have a RCA in at least one GMO industry relative to the other countries
in the region, suggesting specialization within LA. Further, we found that
intra-regional trade is modest relative to external trade. For the intra-
regional trade that does exist, Argentina and Paraguay are the prominent
exporters within the region. These patterns of RCA support our decision to
focus on Argentina and Brazil as influential GMO exporters.
Second, we estimated the Gravity model to examine the effects of import-
ing countries’ policies on the bilateral exports of Argentina and Brazil in
soybeans and maize. We found that Argentina and Brazil tend to export
more to countries that are large in economic and market size, geographically
adjacent, distant (after controlling for adjacency), and similar in language.
We also found that Argentina tends to export less to importers with strong
policy regimes. The strength of importers’ policies has an overwhelmingly
negative effect on Argentina’s bilateral exports of soybeans. The trade-
affecting policies include risk assessment, traceability, coexistence guide-
lines, and intellectual property rights. In contrast, we found that policies do
not tend to affect bilateral flows for Brazil and for maize (although there are
several exceptions). This is not surprising given the historically higher con-
centration of GMO content in soybeans in Argentina. We conclude that the
strong policy effects for Argentina’s soybean exports may be predictive of
effects that will emerge as importers adjust to the increasing GMO content
in Argentinean maize and Brazilian soybeans and maize.
Third, we considered several extensions. First, we performed a lagged
policy experiment to assess endogeneity as well as the lag structure between
policies and their effects on trade. We found that importers’ policies have a
negative effect on Argentina’s soybean and maize exports. Further, we
found that the effects of importers’ policies are larger and/or more statistic-
ally significant when the lag between policy adoption and trade increases.
In contrast, we found that Brazil tended to export more soybeans and maize
to countries with relatively strong policies in 2008, but not thereafter. This
finding reflects Brazil’s changing trade patterns away from the EU and to-
ward Asia that occurred as the GMO shares of soybean and maize
increased. This finding suggests that changes in GMO content prompted
Brazil to search for import markets with pro-GMO policies. Second, we ana-
lyzed deviations in policy effects between 2008, 2011, and 2014. The findings
were consistent with those discussed above. Third, we considered robust-
ness with respect to method including OLS, Tobit, and PPML. We found
that the quantitative results vary (as expected), but the qualitative results
are indeed robust. Finally, we assessed robustness with respect to time
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factors that could potentially affect trade. One potentially important time
factor is weather and/or crop shortages. While weather and crop shortages
may indeed affect trade, we found that our results are robust with respect to
time fixed effects that occur across multiple countries in a given year.
These findings have a number of practical policy implications for coun-
tries that export and import GMOs. First, we conclude that GMO exporters
(such as Argentina and Brazil) could strengthen their labeling, traceability,
and coexistence guidelines to ensure the transparency of product character-
istics and the identity preservation that importing countries increasingly de-
mand. Fortifying supply chains in this way could enable GMO exporters to
soften the negative trade effects of importers’ regulations. Also, efforts to
harmonize their policies with those of their prominent importers could
lower trade costs by reducing regulatory compliance costs. Further, expor-
ters with increasing GMO content (i.e., China, Paraguay, Pakistan, South
Africa, Uruguay, Philippines, and Mexico) could diversify their trading rela-
tionships and reorient trade toward countries with more permissive GMO
policies. In practice, this would likely result in closer trade ties with impor-
ters in Asia (particularly China), the Middle East, and the Americas, and
weaker ties with countries in Africa, the EU, and Oceania.
Second, our findings suggest that importing countries also have an inter-
est in considering the trade impacts of their domestic GMO policies. Strict
requirements raise the costs of regulatory compliance for importing firms
and potentially force firms to import from higher-cost sources, thus raising
consumer prices. Furthermore, our analysis shows evidence of a lag in the
trade effects of GMO policies. Policy-driven impacts on trade may not ap-
pear immediately, but may grow over time as import/export firms adjust to
new regulations. Accordingly, regulators could assess policies based on lon-
ger timeframes.
Finally, our results indicate that countries aiming to limit GMO imports
(such as EU and some African countries) may be able to do so effectively
without banning GMOs outright. Our results suggest that restrictive re-
quirements (via multiple policy instruments) are associated with reductions
in GMO imports, and may in the long-term serve to realign trade relation-
ships away from GMO-heavy exporters. Nevertheless, the negative trade ef-
fect of regulations suggests that restrictive policies will continue to raise
concerns/disputes over violations of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary and
Technical Barriers to Trade agreements of the World Trade Organization.
In light of our results, we conclude that GMO policies are indeed “trade-
related.” Our analysis of LA (and Argentina and Brazil in particular) pro-
vides a benchmark for future research on other developing countries that
are rapidly expanding their commitments to GMO crops.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material is available at Applied Economic Perspectives and
Policy online.
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